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I.  Introduction 
Engers and several other AT&T employees (collectively, Engers) appeal several 
orders of the District Court granting summary judgment on their claims against AT&T 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA).  In 1998, Engers brought a class action against AT&T, 
alleging that changes to its Management Employees’ Pension Plan (the Plan) in April 
1997 disproportionately harmed older employees in violation of the ADEA, and violated 
ERISA’s disclosure, anti-backloading, and anti-cutback rules.  After extensive discovery 
and over a decade of litigation, the District Court granted summary judgment to AT&T 
on all of Engers’s claims.  Engers contends on appeal that the District Court 
misinterpreted the ADEA and several ERISA provisions and mistakenly concluded that 
certain of his claims had not been adequately pleaded.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm. 
II.  Background 
Because we write for the parties, we assume familiarity with the facts in this case 
as set out in previous opinions of the District Court, and only briefly summarize them 
here.1
                                                 
1 See Engers v. AT&T, Inc., No. 98-3660,  2010 WL 2326211 (D.N.J. June 7, 
2010); Engers v. AT&T Corp., No. 98-3660, 2006 WL 3359722 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2006); 
Engers v. AT&T, 428 F. Supp. 2d 213 (D.N.J. 2006); Engers v. AT&T, No. 98-3660, 
2002 WL 32159586 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2002). 
  Prior to its amendment in April 1997, the Plan provided participants with a 
pension based on their average pay over a “pay base averaging period” and in each 
subsequent year.  The Plan also provided generous early retirement subsidies, which 
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permitted participants to retire as early as age 55 and receive their full pensions.  In April 
1997, AT&T amended the Plan to phase out the early retirement subsidy and replace the 
pay-average formula with a cash balance system, under which each participant would be 
assigned a hypothetical cash balance which would be increased by pay and interest 
credits for each year of service.2  However, there were no generous early retirement 
subsidies for benefits accruing under the cash balance plan – instead early retirement 
benefits were actuarially reduced to account for the fact that the participant’s cash 
balance was being distributed over a longer period of time.  To mitigate the effect of 
these changes on older plan participants, the Plan amendments created a frozen “special 
update” benefit, which provided a significant, one-time increase to each participant’s 
benefits, and was also subject to the generous early retirement subsidies available under 
the old Plan.3
One implication of the Plan amendments was that many older Plan participants 
experienced 7-8 years of “wear-away,” a period during which their cash balance would 
  To ensure that participants’ benefits were not reduced, the amended Plan 
provided that retiring participants were entitled to the greater of (1) their benefits accrued 
under the old Plan, (2) the frozen special update benefit (both of which had generous 
early retirement subsidies) or (3) their gradually increasing cash balance benefits (which 
did not have any early retirement subsidy).   
                                                 
2 The Plan document was revised and restated on October 20, 2000 to incorporate 
the April 1997 amendments.   
3 The Plan amendments actually made early retirement benefits more generous in 
some respects by eliminating age and service requirements that had prevented employees 
from receiving early retirement benefits before age 50.   
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grow, but their early retirement benefits would not increase because the actuarially 
discounted value of the cash balance account would be less than the subsidized early 
retirement benefit from the frozen special update benefit.4
                                                 
4 Recall that participants are entitled to the greater of their special update or cash 
balance benefits. 
  Although AT&T was 
concerned that wear-away would be poorly received by employees, it distributed several 
documents explaining the Plan amendments and created a website so that each participant 
could calculate his or her benefits, and determine when his wear-away period would end, 
which AT&T called “crossover.”   
Engers and several other AT&T management employees brought a class action 
against AT&T, alleging, inter alia, that (a) the wear-away periods were 
disproportionately longer for older plan participants, violating the ADEA; (b) key 
features of the new Plan had not been included in the Plan amendments, in violation of 
the written instrument requirement of ERISA § 402(a)(1); (c) AT&T had not adequately 
disclosed the implications of the Plan amendments to plan participants, in violation of its 
fiduciary duties and ERISA §§ 102 and 204(h); (d) the shift to a cash balance formula 
violated the anti-backloading rule of ERISA § 204(g)(2); and (e) the discounting of early 
retirement benefits received before age 50 violated the anti-cutback rule of ERISA § 
204(b).  Over the course of 12 years of litigation, the District Court granted summary 
judgment on all of Engers’s claims, resulting in this appeal. 
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III.  Discussion 
“We review de novo district court orders granting or denying summary judgment,”  
Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 2010), “apply[ing] the 
same test required of the district court and view[ing] inferences to be drawn from the 
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Bayer v. Monroe 
Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2009).  Our review is not 
limited to the reasoning of the court below and we “may affirm the district court on 
grounds different from those relied on by the district court.”5
Engers’s ADEA claim is that the 1997 amendments discriminated against older 
employees because they resulted in longer wear-away periods for older employees.  
ADEA § 4(i)(1) sets out specific rules governing age discrimination relating to retirement 
benefits and Engers does not contest the District Court’s conclusion that the Plan 
amendments complied with these rules.  Engers, 2010 WL 2326211 *4-5 (citing Register 
v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 477 F.3d 56, 68 (3d Cir. 2007)).  The court found that 
Engers’ wear-away claims related to benefit accrual, and were therefore barred by ADEA 
§ 4(i)(4), which provides – both now and in 1997 – that “[c]ompliance with the 
requirements of this subsection with respect to an employee pension benefit plan shall 
  In re Mushroom Transp. 
Co., 382 F.3d 325, 344 (3d Cir. 2004). 
A.  The ADEA Claim 
                                                 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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constitute compliance with the requirements of this section relating to benefit accrual 
under such plan.”  Engers, 2010 WL 2326211, *4 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(4)).   
On appeal, Engers argues that the District Court erred in treating compliance with 
ADEA § 4(i) as a complete defense to his ADEA claims.6
Some procedural background is necessary to understand Engers’s Plan amendment 
claims.  In October 2004, Engers moved for summary judgment on these claims, arguing 
that two key changes to the Plan were not included in the Plan amendments and had not 
been validly adopted until they were included by AT&T in a restatement of the Plan in 
October of 2000.  As a result, these changes could not be retroactively applied to 
  He contends that amendments 
in 1990 changing the scope of ADEA § 4(a)(1) brought his wear-away claims within that 
subsection and outside the scope of ADEA § 4(i).  We agree with the Tenth Circuit’s 
careful analysis of this argument and its conclusion that the 1990 amendments do not 
affect the scope of ADEA § 4(i).  See Jensen v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., 625 F.3d 641, 
660-61 (10th Cir. 2010).  Engers does not seriously contest the District Court’s ruling that 
his wear-away claims “relat[e] to benefit accrual” and we conclude that this ruling was 
correct.  See Hurlic v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 539 F.3d 1024, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008) (wear-away 
claims relate to benefit accrual).  Accordingly, Engers’s wear-away claims are barred by 
the plain language of ADEA § 4(i)(4). 
B.  The Plan Amendment Claims 
                                                 
6 We reject Enters’s argument that he pleaded a disparate treatment claim and that 
this claim is not precluded by ADEA § 4(i)(4).  Even if this claim was properly pleaded, 
it would arise under ADEA § 4(a), and thus be barred by ADEA § 4(i)(4), which by its 
terms applies to any claim under section 4.  See 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(4). 
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determine benefits during 1997-2000.  Engers therefore interpreted the 1997 amendments 
as entitling participants to (1) the sum of their benefits payable under the special update 
and the cash balance formula, and (2) additional benefit payment options – a lump sum 
payment and a joint and 100% survivor annuity – for their special update benefits as well 
as their cash balance benefits.  The District Court found that these claims were 
unexhausted claims for plan benefits and dismissed them without prejudice.  Engers, 428 
F. Supp. 2d at 227-31.   
In 2006, Engers presented his claim to AT&T’s Benefits Committee, which denied 
it.  In a detailed opinion, the Committee explained that the text of the amendments and 
related documents were inconsistent with Engers’s proposed interpretation.  Concerning 
Engers’s first argument, the Committee pointed out that, because the initial amount in 
each participant’s cash balance account is based on the special update, awarding Engers 
the sum of his special update and cash balance benefits would essentially give him double 
benefits.  Additionally, presentations to AT&T’s Board when it was considering the Plan 
amendments and disclosures to employees immediately following the amendments made 
clear that participants were entitled to the greater of their cash balance and special update 
benefits.  Regarding Engers’s second argument, the Committee noted that the plain 
language of the amendments indicates that the new benefit payment options apply only to 
the cash balance benefit, and that communications to employees immediately following 
the amendments made this point explicit.   
In October 2007, Engers was permitted to file an amended complaint reasserting 
his Plan amendment claims because they had been properly exhausted.  AT&T moved for 
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summary judgment on these claims and Engers argued, again, that key features of the 
new Plan were not validly adopted by the Plan amendments.  The District Court 
dismissed Engers’s claims, finding that his arguments represented an “entirely new legal 
theory” that had not been pleaded in the complaint.  Engers, 2010 WL 2326211, *5-6.  
We agree with Engers that his arguments did not present an entirely new theory and that, 
in any case, he was not required to plead his legal theory in his complaint.  See Skinner v. 
Switzer, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011). 
As it is not clear whether the District Court reached the merits of Engers’s 
amendment claims, we address them here.  Engers does not contest that the Plan 
amendments were validly adopted and thus part of the Plan—rather, he argues that the 
amendments are not properly construed as establishing the greater-of rule and limitations 
on certain benefit options.  Because the Committee had discretionary authority to 
construe the Plan, we review its interpretation of the Plan amendments for abuse of 
discretion.7
                                                 
7 Because Engers’s claim arose in the context of litigation, an argument can be 
made that the Committee had conflicting interests when ruling on the claim, which is a 
factor relevant to the abuse-of-discretion analysis.  See Miller, 632 F.3d at 845 & n.3.  
But Engers does not press this point and, in any case, taking this factor into account 
would not affect the outcome in this case. 
  See Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 844-45 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2011).  
We find that the Committee did not abuse its discretion in denying either of Engers’s 
claims.  First, the Committee reasonably concluded that the Plan amendments did not 
provide participants with double benefits.  The only evidence Engers offers in support of 
his reading of the amendments is the testimony of Brian Byrnes, AT&T’s Human 
Resources director, who acknowledged that, regarding whether participants could receive 
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the sum of their special update and cash balance benefits, the board “didn’t say you 
could.  They didn’t say you couldn’t.”  He later clarified that providing the sum of the 
two benefits was inconsistent with the Plan’s design.  This testimony shows at most that 
the language of the Plan amendments was ambiguous.  It does not show that the 
Committee resolved that ambiguity incorrectly, and Engers does not address the 
Committee’s arguments for its interpretation, which are eminently reasonable.  Engers 
offers no evidence for his second claim regarding benefit payment options, and we agree 
with the Committee that the plain language of the Plan amendments precludes his claim.  
Accordingly, AT&T was entitled to summary judgment on Engers’s Plan amendment 
claims. 
C.  The Disclosure Claims  
Engers claims that AT&T’s disclosures regarding the amended Plan violated three 
different ERISA provisions. 
1.  Disclosure of Benefit Reduction Under ERISA § 204(h).  Engers’s first claim 
is that AT&T failed to provide adequate advance notice to participants that the Plan 
amendments “provide[d] for a significant reduction in the rate of future benefit accrual” 
as required by ERISA § 204(h), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h).  The District Court found that this 
claim was governed by Treasury regulations interpreting ERISA § 204(h), which provide 
that “an amendment to a defined benefit plan affects the rate of future benefit accrual 
only if it is reasonably expected to change the amount of the future annual benefit 
commencing at normal retirement age.”  26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-6T, Q&A-5, 60 Fed. Reg. 
64,320, 64,322 (1995).  Because even Engers’s expert calculated that retirement benefits 
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available at normal retirement age would be higher under the cash balance formula or 
special update formula than under the prior plan formula, the court found that AT&T had 
complied with the regulation and was entitled to summary judgment.  Engers, 428 F. 
Supp. 2d at 221-22; Engers, 2006 WL 3359722, *2-3.  Engers argues that the District 
Court should not have considered the combined effect of the special update and cash 
balance formulae when determining whether the Plan amendments resulted in a 
significant reduction in benefit accruals.  Even if this were true, Engers does not show 
that either formula considered separately would result in lower normal age retirement 
benefits than those under the old Plan, and his own expert’s report shows the opposite.8
2.  Adequacy of Summary Plan Description Under ERISA § 102(a).  Engers’s 
next claim is that AT&T’s disclosures explaining the Plan amendments and summary 
plan description (SPD) describing the amended plan violated ERISA § 102(a) because 
they were not “written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan 
participant, and . . . sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such 
participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.”  29 U.S.C. 
1022(a).  The District Court found that Engers could not recover on this claim because he 
had failed to show “extraordinary circumstances” such as “‘circumstances . . . where the 
employer has acted in bad faith, or has actively concealed a change in the benefit plan, 
  
The District Court therefore correctly granted summary judgment on this claim. 
                                                 
8 The expert’s calculation of the special update benefit inaccurately states the 
value of the special update benefit because it is based on his mistaken view that the 
special update benefit should not be frozen but should be treated as an increasing benefit.  
However, the Plan amendments and Plan document make clear that the special update 
benefit is frozen and does not increase.   
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and the covered employees have been substantively harmed by virtue of the employer’s 
actions.’”  Engers, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (quoting Ackerman v. Warnaco, Inc., 55 F.3d 
117, 125 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Engers contends on appeal that he offered sufficient evidence 
that AT&T actively concealed certain features of the Plan amendments and that the 
District Court did not properly apply the summary judgment standard to consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to him.9
We disagree.  At most, Engers’s evidence shows that AT&T was concerned that 
the possibility of crossover or wear-away would “undercut[] Cash Balance if highlighted 
or placed in front” and did not want to “tell the bad parts upfront.”  But regardless of any 
 
                                                 
9 Engers also argues that he was not required to establish extraordinary 
circumstances under Burstein v. Retirement Account Plan, because in that case we 
permitted an employee to recover benefits misleadingly promised by an SPD without 
requiring a showing of extraordinary circumstances.  334 F.3d 365, 376-80 (3d Cir. 
2003).  This confuses two different claims considered in Burstein.  We did not require the 
plan participant in Burstein to show extraordinary circumstances to recover benefits 
promised in the SPD under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).  See id.  But we did require the 
participant to show extraordinary circumstances to recover on a separate equitable 
estoppel claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3).  See id. at 383.  Because Engers seeks equitable 
relief, and not a benefit promised him in his SPD, he must show extraordinary 
circumstances. 
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011), does not alter this 
conclusion.  There the Court held that a showing of “detrimental reliance” is not 
necessary for all forms of equitable relief under § 502(a)(3).  Id. at 1880-82 
(“Information-related circumstances, violations, and injuries are potentially too various in 
nature to insist that harm must always meet that more vigorous ‘detrimental harm’ 
standard when equity imposed no such strict requirement.”)  However, the Court 
expressly declined to address “other prerequisites” for equitable relief, id. at 1883, and 
thus we see no reason to depart from our longstanding rule that an equitable estoppel 
claim under § 502(a)(3) cannot be based merely on “simple ERISA reporting errors or 
disclosure violations, such as a variation between a plan summary and the plan itself, or 
an omission in the disclosure documents,” without a showing of extraordinary 
circumstances.  Burstein, 334 F.3d at 383 (quoting  Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 
F.3d 1544, 1553 (3d Cir. 1996)) (emphasis deleted). 
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reluctance, AT&T provided multiple disclosures describing clearly and in detail the 
possibility of wear-away.  For example, a letter sent to participants only weeks after the 
Plan amendments were adopted illustrated wear-away by providing examples of the 
benefits that two hypothetical employees retiring in 1997 – one under age 55 and one 
over age 55 – would receive under the amended Plan, and informed employees that “if 
you are within 7 years of retirement eligibility under the current plan, your special update 
will most likely provide a greater benefit than the cash balance feature.”  Additionally, 
AT&T created a pension website that enabled participants to see their cash balance 
accounts and identified their “crossover year – when your single life annuity (SLA) under 
Cash Balance exceeds your SLA under your prior accrued pension benefit.”   
Engers also points to evidence that AT&T deliberately avoided comparing benefits 
under the new Plan to benefits under the old Plan.  But as the District Court explained, 
the comparison insisted upon by Engers would have been misleading.  Engers, 428 F. 
Supp. 2d at 242-43.  As it stood prior to amendment in April 1997, the old Plan would 
provide fewer benefits to employees than the new Plan.  The comparison that Engers 
contends would show that the new Plan reduced benefits was based on the assumption 
that AT&T would continue its prior practice of amending the old Plan’s pay average 
formula to allow employees to benefit from larger salaries (which AT&T was under no 
obligation to do).  But AT&T did not intend to continue that practice – that was why it 
adopted the Plan amendments.  Even if AT&T should have compared benefits under the 
old and new plans (a comparison favorable to the new Plan), it certainly was not required 
to compare benefits under the new Plan to what they might have been had AT&T decided 
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to keep updating the pay average formula.10
3.  Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Inform Participants.  Engers’s final disclosure 
claim is that AT&T breached its fiduciary duty to provide material information to 
participants, and specifically that it failed to inform participants of the differing values of 
optional benefit forms available under the Plan.  The District Could held that because 
Engers had “the ability to proceed under [ERISA] § 502(a)(1)(B) for Defendants’ alleged 
violation of [ERISA] § 102,” he not could not obtain “appropriate equitable relief” under  
ERISA § 502(a)(3).  Engers,  428 F. Supp. 2d at 235-36 (citing Varity Corp. v. Howe, 
516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996)).  AT&T does not defend this conclusion and we agree with 
Engers that the District Court erred.  As we have explained above, Engers’s allegations 
that AT&T’s 1998 SPD did not comply with ERISA § 102 cannot support a claim for 
benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) because he does not seek benefits promised to him 
in the SPD.  See supra n.9.  Rather, Engers can only obtain equitable relief under ERISA 
§ 502(a)(3) for AT&T’s alleged breach of ERISA § 102.  The District Court did not 
consider whether the availability of one type of equitable relief under § 502(a)(3) should 
preclude other types of equitable relief under the same subsection, and our precedent 
suggests the contrary.  See, e.g., Burstein 334 F.3d at 370-71, 385-87 (considering merits 
  We conclude that AT&T’s disclosures were 
adequate and that no reasonable jury could conclude that AT&T actively concealed wear-
away or other key plan features from participants.  Summary judgment for AT&T on this 
claim was therefore proper. 
                                                 
10 Moreover, AT&T’s practice of updating the formula was inconsistent, and we 
see no objective way for AT&T to predict how it would have made changes to the 
formula that it did not intend to make. 
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of fiduciary duty claim after affirming dismissal of equitable estoppel claim).  
Accordingly, Engers’s fiduciary duty claim was not barred under Varity. 
However, we will affirm judgment for AT&T on Engers’s fiduciary duty claim 
because it has not been adequately pleaded.  The Complaint alleges only that AT&T 
breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose “the disadvantages of the ‘new’ cash 
balance features and transitional provisions, compared to the ‘old’ defined benefit plan,” 
and contains no allegations regarding the relative value of various benefit options that are 
available under the cash balance plan.  But in this appeal and at least since 2003, Engers 
has advanced a different argument that AT&T failed to disclosed the “relative values” of 
benefit payment options (i.e., different types of annuities, or a lump sum payment) 
available from the cash balance benefit, and that AT&T “misrepresent[ed] . . . that the 
‘overall value’ of the options was the same.”11
                                                 
11 Engers does not mention on appeal his original breach of fiduciary duty claim 
predicated on AT&T’s alleged failure to adequately inform plan participants about wear-
away and provide a comparison between benefits under the old Plan and the new Plan.  
Even if these claims are not waived, for the reasons we have set out above, there is no 
genuine issue of material fact about the adequacy of AT&T’s disclosures on these points, 
and summary judgment on this claim was proper.  
  This argument “fails at the most basic 
level because it finds no support in the plain language of [Engers’s] complaint.”  Horvath 
v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 459 (3d Cir. 2003).  Engers has amended 
his complaint several times during the decade of litigation before the District Court but 
has never sought leave to include a claim concerning AT&T’s disclosure of the relative 
value of benefit options.  Because Engers has failed to plead this claim, we will not now 
consider it on appeal.  See id. 
16 
 
D.  The Anti-Backloading Claim 
Engers claims that wear-away resulting from the Plan amendments violates the 
anti-backloading rule of ERISA § 204(b), because participants’ benefit accrual rates in 
later plan years are more than 133 1/3% of the benefit accrual rate during the wear-away 
period, which he claims was zero.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(B).  The District Court 
rejected this argument because even though early retirement benefits do not increase 
during wear-away, participants’ cash balance accounts continue to increase.  Engers, 
2010 WL 2326211, *7-9 (citing Register, 477 F.3d at 72).  Engers argues that accrual of 
early retirement benefits rather than cash balance amounts should be considered in 
applying the anti-backloading rule.  He points out that the anti-backloading rule applies to 
the accrual rate of benefits that are “payable,” which in his view refers to benefits that are 
immediately payable to a plan participant, i.e., early retirement benefits.  But the plain 
language of ERISA § 204(b) refutes this argument:  the anti-backloading rule applies to 
“the annual rate at which any individual who is or could be a participant can accrue the 
retirement benefits payable at normal retirement age under the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 
1054(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1054(b)(1)(B)(iii) (in applying anti-
backloading rule “the fact that benefits under the plan may be payable to certain 
employees before normal retirement age shall be disregarded”).  Additionally, the statute 
provides that, in applying the anti-backloading rule, “any amendment to the plan which is 
in effect for the current year shall be treated as in effect for all other plan years,” which 
means that the transition between the old and new plans and resulting wear-away must be 
disregarded.  Id. § 1054(b)(1)(B)(i).  The District Court therefore correctly rejected 
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Engers’s anti-backloading claim premised on the accrual rate of participants’ early 
retirement benefits. 
E.  The Anti-Cutback Claim 
Engers’s final claim is that the amended Plan violates the anti-cutback rule of 
ERISA § 204(g)(2), which prohibits the reduction of accrued benefits or the imposition of 
greater restrictions on the receipt of accrued benefits.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(2); Cent. 
Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 744 (2004).  Under the old, pre-1997 
Plan, participants retiring between ages 50-55 were entitled to receive their age-55 early 
retirement benefits, reduced by 6% for each year they were retiring prior to age 55.  But 
the Plan’s age and service requirements did not permit participants to receive benefits 
before age 50.  The Plan amendments removed the age and service restrictions on receipt 
of benefits prior to age 50, but provided that, like early retirement benefits taken between 
ages 50-55, benefits taken before age 50 would be also be reduced by 6% for each year a 
participant retired before age 55.  Engers argues that extension of the 6% per year benefit 
reduction – which he claims is “actuarially unreasonable” – to benefits available when 
retiring before age 50 constitutes the imposition of an additional restriction on benefits in 
violation of the anti-cutback rule.12
                                                 
12 Engers’s argument that the 6% per year discount rate is “actuarially 
unreasonable” has no bearing on the anti-cutback rule.  Berger v. Xerox Corp. Ret. 
Income Guar. Plan, 338 F.3d 755, 762 (7th Cir. 2003), on which Engers relies, concerns 
the requirements of ERISA § 204(c)(3), not § 204(g)(2), and Engers has not appealed the 
District Court’s (correct) conclusion that the 6% yearly reduction does not violate ERISA 
§ 204(c)(3).  See Engers, 2010 WL 2326211, *9-11. 
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Engers’s argument fails for two reasons.  First, prior to the 1997 amendments, 
participants could not receive any benefits before age 50 and thus had no “‘early 
retirement benefit’ that was earned by service before the amendment was passed” and 
then was improperly reduced.  Heinz, 541 U.S. at 744.  Rather, the Plan amendments 
simultaneously conferred a right to benefits before age 50 and provided that such benefits 
would be reduced by 6% for each year that participants retired before age 55.  Second, 
even if participants are considered to have, in some sense, “earned” early retirement 
benefits before age 50, the Plan amendments did not “impose materially greater 
restrictions on the receipt of” these benefits and did not reduce benefits payable before 
age 50.  Rather such benefits were increased from nothing to a percentage of the age-55 
early retirement benefit.  We do not see how “in any practical sense” this change could be 
“viewed as shrinking the value” of participants’ benefits.  Id. at 745.  Summary judgment 
on Engers’s anti-cutback claim was therefore proper. 
IV.  Conclusion 
For the reasons set out above, we will affirm the orders of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to AT&T on all of Engers’s claims.  
